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Ikäihmisten määrä on kasvamassa 1,2 miljoonasta 1,5 miljoonaan seuraavan kymmenen vuoden 
aikana. Yhteiskunnalliset päätökset ovat pyrkineet takaamaan kelvolliset asuinolot jokaiselle 
ikäihmiselle. Yksi keinoista on jälkiasennettujen hissien asennuksen rahallinen tukeminen 
asuinkerrostaloihin, joissa ei ole ennestään hissiä. Suomen laki ohjaa korkeampien kerrosten 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Ministry of Environment started a program in 2013 to improve housing circumstances 
for the elderly. Projections about increasing amount of elderly citizens, and their expected 
housing circumstances without policy actions created the motivation for the extensive 
program. The length of the program was four years, and it involved multiple organizations 
from the public and private organizations. The Housing Finance and Development Centre of 
Finland (Ara), Association of Finnish Municipalities (Kuntaliitto), and Finnish Environment 
Institute (SYKE) had main responsibilities in the program execution. As part of the program, 
a nationwide lift subsidy was advertised for private housing condominiums to increase lift 
installations in blocks of flats without prior lifts. In 17 municipalities, teams were gathered 
with a purpose to prospect and inform the housing condominiums about possibilities to 
install a lift. The teams consisted of the municipality officials who worked at the housing 
sector. Some municipalities introduced their additional subsidy on top of the nationwide 
subsidy. 
Accessible housing increases utility for the physically restricted. Those who live in 
inaccessible buildings with physical restrictions, are not able to go to grocery stores, 
common saunas, or visit their friends or families. Lift is considered being the most important 
component of increasing accessibility in a building (Kotilainen et. al, 2016). With assistance 
devices, such as wheelchairs, it is almost impossible to move the stairs. Even without any 
assistance devices, it requires a higher effort to go vertically rather than horizontally. 
Consequently, stairs tend to become obstacles, even though walking on flat surfaces was 
possible. 
The housing stock conversion accessible with lift installations seems to have positive 
externalities. First, the risk of injuries decrease, which decreases medical care costs. Second, 
enabling accessible living for everyone in society may increase utility for rest of the 
population. Without subsidizing the lift installations, alternative options were for example 
relocating the physically restricted to a retirement home or providing other accessible 
housing, such as a dwelling from a municipality owned housing company. 
However, the subsidy could potentially lead to socially undesirable outcomes. If the subsidy 
recipients had wealth to buy accessible housing in case of physical restrictions, the subsidy 
would become an unnecessary income transfer. For example, if the student housing company 
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would receive the subsidies, the target of the policy would not fulfill its purposes. The threat 
of socially undesirable outcomes would become prominent if the property value increase 
would exceed the subsidized lift installation costs. In that scenario, every block of flat 
without a lift should theoretically invest in lifts.  
As a part of hedonic pricing literature, my main intention in this thesis is to estimate the 
effect of lift installations on housing prices. I have not found efforts from the previous 
literature trying to estimate the abovementioned effect. Consequently, the study fills a gap 
in real estate hedonic pricing literature and provides perspectives for policy-makers when 
evaluating the lift subsidy. In this thesis, I refer lift installations as those, that are conducted 
in buildings without prior lifts. I utilize difference in differences setup with the majority of 
dwelling transactions conducted in blocks of flats in Finland between 2000 – 2018.  
The Finnish law for the housing condominiums determines the principles of cost allocation 
of a lift installation (AOYL 6/32 §3). The maintenance charge allocation score multiplied by 
floor level determines the portion of costs. For example, if the apartments in a stairway were 
similar, the fourth floor tenants pay four times higher charges compared to the first floor 
tenants. The implicit assumption of the law is that utility from a lift increases linearly as the 
floor gets higher. Unfortunately, no one knows whether this assumption holds in reality 
creating possibly unequal cost allocation for the tenants. I study how much lift installation 
affects prices across the floors. 
The municipalities differ in their generosity to pay additional lift subsidy. Oulu is the most 
generous one offering 20% additional subsidy, whereas Lahti does not grant additional 
subsidies. Some municipalities find the conversion of the existing housing stock accessible 
so important, that they have officials advising the housing condominiums in the lift 
installation process. I also study the effect of lift installation in eight municipalities. 
My main result is that a lift installation increases dwelling prices by two percent. I find 
increasing lift premiums as the floor level increases until the fourth floor. Eight 
municipalities (Helsinki, Espoo, Turku, Tampere, Lahti, Jyväskylä, Kuopio, and Oulu) were 
studied. I cannot confirm that the effects were heterogenous from the average two percent in 
seven municipalities. An exception is Oulu, where lift premium is six percent.  
My research mitigates the concern of undesirable outcomes of the subsidy policy. An 
indicative calculation shows, that property value increase unlikely exceeds the subsidized 
installation. From the other perspective, the housing condominiums can cover almost 50 
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percent of their subsidized installation costs after the property values increase. I find 
evidence that the current cost allocation principle is more equal for the households compared 
to a method, where installation costs were evenly distributed. However, the cost allocation 
could be more equal for the households, if the cost allocation multipliers increased slower 
than they currently do as the floor level increases. 
For the study, I have interviewed experts who have the most knowledge regarding lift 
installations. Simo Merilä is a lift installation officer1 from municipality of Helsinki. 
Furthermore, I have interviewed representatives of Ara and Ministry of Environment in 
Finland, but they are not referred in this thesis. I have divided this study into seven sections. 
Section 2 provides a short review for the hedonic pricing literature. Section 3 represents the 
Finnish housing market characteristics, and the subsidy policy. Discussion about the subsidy 
policy is provided. Section 4 gives perspective about the reliability of the results, justifies 
my assumptions in identification of lift installations, and helps the following researchers to 
do a replication of this study. In section 5, I represent the empirical model. Section 6 report 
the results and implications of the study. Section 7 summarizes the thesis. From the 
appendix, you can find fully reported regression tables and other material related to the topic. 
  
                                                 
1 The official title is Helsingin Hissiasiamies 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The traditional models in economics assume that goods are homogenous within the markets 
that they are traded. In reality, this assumption rarely holds. If you buy morning cereals from 
a grocery store next to you, the option range is wide between the products. Should we then 
consider all of the different packages as being traded at the same of different markets?  
Two approaches enable conducting economic analysis with these products. The first is to 
treat all of the different cereal packages as having their own monopoly2, but still competing 
with the other. The competition arises, because a consumer finds the cereals being substitutes 
with each other at some degree. Another approach is to use a hedonic model. It assumes that 
goods that are bundles of their attributes. Hedonic pricing is used to discover the implicit 
prices of the attributes. In my context, lifts do not have their own price tags when dwellings 
are transacted. Hence, a hedonic model is required if the implicit price tags of lifts were 
ought to be found. 
2.1. HEDONIC PRICING MODEL 
In the beginning of the 20th century, the first steps towards hedonic pricing were taken when 
differences in product heterogeneity was considered affecting the pricing. Andrew Court is 
titled as a pioneer of hedonic pricing widely in the literature (e.g. Chau, 2003; Sheppard, 
1999; Goodman, 1998). Court worked in the automotive industry, trying to generate a price 
index for automobiles. He found that multiple aspects, such as the amount of horsepower 
and number of windows, affected the pricing of automobiles. Based on his work, he 
published an article in 1939 describing a price index development at the automotive industry. 
Court´s price index was advanced, as it accounted for product heterogeneity.  
The literature has also consensus that Lancaster in 1966 and Rosen in 1974 led the second 
phase of hedonic pricing evolvement (e.g. Chau & Chin, 2003; Sheppard, 1999; Sirmans, 
Macpherson, & Zietz, 2005). While Court´s approach was more influenced by practice, the 
second phase researchers had more generalized conclusions. Sirmans et al. (2005) interpret 
Lancaster´s work creating a consumer theory for differentiated goods. Lancaster (1966) 
found the vulnerability in the traditional consumer theory, of which I described in the 
beginning of this section. The classical models would treat goods (cars in Lancaster´s 
example) as either completely different, or homogenous products. The following paper by 
                                                 
2 Dixit et al. (1977) were pioneers in creating analysis for monopolistic competition 
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Rosen (1974) utilized Lancaster´s consumer theory and focused on the price determination 
in real estate markets. Sheppard (1999) combines the previous microeconomic literature in 
housing context.  
Following Sheppard (1999), consumers (households) are expected to receiving utility 
 𝑢𝑢 = 𝑢𝑢(𝑍𝑍,𝑌𝑌, 𝑎𝑎) (1) 
Utility for a household depends on consumption of differentiated good Z, all the other goods 
Y, and a vector of consumer´s preferences a. Differentiated good Z is in our case an 
apartment that is consisted of a vector of attributes. The utility function could take for 
instance a Cobb-Douglas3 form.  
A household´s willing-to-pay for an apartment depends on how much it appreciates its 
different attributes given its budget constraint. Budget constraint is determined by income 
level M and the prices of the goods. Consequently, the households make bids that are equal 
to their willingness-to-pay for the dwellings. Formally, the “bid-rent” function is defined as 
 β (𝑍𝑍,𝑀𝑀,𝑢𝑢,𝑎𝑎) (2) 
The partial derivative of the bid rent function 𝜕𝜕β
𝜕𝜕𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖
  determines how much more the consumer 
is would pay for a dwelling if an attribute 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 was increased by one unit when holding the 
utility level constant.   
There are different dwellings on the markets. The household chooses the dwelling, that 
maximizes the utility function (1) with respect to all the attributes Z and composite good Y 
such that the budget constraint (3) is satisfied. Budget constraint is determined by 
 𝑀𝑀 ≤ 𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍) + 𝑌𝑌 (3) 
The budget constraint determines that total income must be lower than price of the bundled 
good and prices of all the other goods. P(Z) is referred as hedonic price function. Price of a 
bundle consists of n attributes of z and their prices pi. 
 𝑃𝑃(𝑍𝑍) = 𝑝𝑝1𝑧𝑧1 + 𝑝𝑝2𝑧𝑧2 + 𝑝𝑝3𝑧𝑧3+. . . +𝑝𝑝𝑛𝑛𝑧𝑧𝑛𝑛 (4) 
                                                 
3 Example of Cobb-Douglas: 𝑢𝑢 = 𝑍𝑍𝑎𝑎1 ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎2   
If Z consisted of four different attributes, the functional form for the utility function could be 
 𝑢𝑢 = (𝑧𝑧1𝑎𝑎11 + 𝑧𝑧2𝑎𝑎12 + 𝑧𝑧3𝑎𝑎13 + 𝑧𝑧4𝑎𝑎14) ∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑎𝑎2  
Note, that all the households are expected having their own vector of the preference parameters 
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By solving the maximization problem for the household, the price of an attribute Pi must be 
equal to a relationship between change in utility as amount of the consumed attribute 
increases, and change in utility as amount of consumed composite good increases. As a 
consequence from the utility maximization process, the implicit prices are determined by 
 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢/𝜕𝜕𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢/𝜕𝜕𝑌𝑌  (5) 
Price of attribute i must be equal the change in household´s payoff with respect to change of 
attribute i. The price for an attribute increases, if its preference parameter increases relatively 
to the other preference parameters. With competitive markets, the implicit prices must be 
equal their marginal costs of production. The theory implies that the consumers affect the 
lift prices based on their utility maximization that compares lifts to rest of the dwelling 
attributes, and other goods given the income level. 
2.2. APPLICATIONS OF THE HEDONIC PRICING MODEL 
Automobiles and real estate seem to be the most common industries, where hedonic pricing 
is utilized. The industries are expected to benefit from the hedonic pricing model, because 
their products are heterogenous, durable, and expensive. Sheppard (1999) identifies two 
main branches in hedonic pricing studies at the housing markets. 1) Discovering implicit 
price of one particular attribute. 2) Utilizing the implicit prices to discover welfare effects in 
the society with respect to changes in the attribute prices. Naturally, the second branch of 
research requires more a detailed approximation of the demand curve, and thus it is more 
challenging to conduct. My study belongs to the first branch of research, as I try to find price 
increase of a bundle (apartment) due to an attribute (lift). 
The literature does not have consensus about how the housing attributes should be 
categorized. Chau & Chin (2003) divide three attribute categories affecting the housing 
prices: Locational, structural, and neighborhood –attributes. Locational relates usually the 
distance from the house to central business district. Structural attributes are something 
attached to the house such as size or building material. Neighborhood –attributes relate to 
the quality of the neighborhood, such as crime rate. On the contrary, Sirmans et al. (2005) 
identify only two categories: physical and other factors. The physical attributes consists of 
the similar attributes as Chau & Chin´s (2003) structural and locational attributes. The other 
factors could be for example school quality or air pollution.  
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I have found the most extensive research been conducted among the locational or 
neighborhood attributes. Quite often, ceteris paribus can be revealed after having an 
exogenous shock to certain area and utilizing difference in differences or regression 
discontinuity design. Examples of these types of exogenous shocks are often policy decisions 
such as public transport line installation (e.g. Harjunen 2018) or changes in school 
boundaries ((Harjunen, Kortelainen, & Saarimaa, 2014). The effect of structural (or 
physical) attributes on housing prices are prone to have a omitted variable bias4 harming the 
causal interpretation of those studies.  
Despite the omitted variable challenges with the structural variables, Harjunen & Liski 
(2014) studied the impact of energy efficiency on housing prices. They overcame the issues 
related to location- and neighborhood attributes issues with location-specific fixed effects. 
Neighborhood (250m2 x 250m2  area) fixed effects, and a wide set of other attributes enabled 
them to do a causal interpretation. This thesis overcomes the problem of locational attributes 
correlating with prices with building specific fixed effects. 
The most interesting finding from the literature review is the low amount of real estate 
pricing studies, where lifts were under attention. I did not find any empirical papers where 
the effect of lift on housing prices was studied. Moreover, lifts are rarely used even as control 
variables. Sirmans et. al (2005) conducted quite an exhaustive literature review of the 
hedonic pricing models used in real estate pricing. They examined 125 empirical hedonic 
pricing studies, and collected the outcome statistics for all the dependent and independent 
variables. They listed over a hundred variables including variables such as cable TV -
dummy, oil spill on waterfront lot, and consumer price index for fuel, but the lifts were 
omitted. In those 125 hedonic real estate pricing papers, no one had lifts even as a control 
variable. 
I found only couple of hedonic pricing papers mentioning lift as an independent variable. 
Chiarazzo et. al (2014) found a positive impact of lift on property values using the hedonic 
pricing model while studying the pollution effects on housing prices. However, they did not 
control for the age of apartment or the condition yielding to biased5 lift estimate. Another 
                                                 
4 Let´s say you wanted to study the causal effect of building material on housing prices. It is impossible to 
change the material, so you must compare different buildings with each other. After controlling a wide range 
of attributes with your dataset, how can you be sure that some unobserved variable is not correlated with the 
building material? Obviously, this is a challenge for all the researchers trying to identify causal effect of the 
structural attributes on housing prices. 
5 Most likely a lift correlates with age of the building. Alternatively, a lift could correlate with an overall 
condition of the building  
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discovery of lifts as control variable was hedonic pricing study conducted in Turkey. Selim 
(2011) used a wide range of structural variables in his hedonic OLS regression, and found 
that lifts increased the housing prices by 17%. However, he omitted almost completely the 
location-attributes yielding most likely biased estimates.  
A conclusion of this chapter is that hedonic pricing model is a commonly used tool for 
studying prices of attributes that are sold in bundles. Thus, real estate fits well in hedonic 
pricing models. Exogenous shocks, such as policy interventions, create random assignments 
which are beneficial if causal link a dwelling attribute and price was tried to discover. Policy 
interventions have enabled the Finnish researchers to study effects of locational attributes on 
housing prices. However, it seems to be less common to attempt discovering effect of a 
structural variable and price. Hedonic pricing literature in real estate has covered numerous 
of attributes, but the absence of lifts is remarkable.  
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3. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
In this section, I approximate the number of inaccessible residential blocks of flats and the 
number of citizens living in those buildings. I continue by presenting the lift subsidy. Last, 
I discuss the circumstances under which the subsidy policy is beneficial for society.   
3.1. THE HOUSING STRUCTURE IN FINLAND 
Table 1 shows the number of households living in different types of buildings.  
Table 1 – Number of Households (2018) 
 Building Type Number of households Percentage of total 
Other building 43 968 2 % 
Attached houses 367 712 14 % 
Detached and semi-detached 
houses 1 055 409 39 % 
Blocks of flats 1 238 410 46 % 
   
Total 2 705 499 100 % 
Source of the data: Official Statistics Finland (OSF). Household is commonly defined as the group of people 
living under the same roof and eating from the same fridge. Hence, the figures of households are almost 
identical to the number of dwellings, when assumed zero vacancy for the dwellings.  
 
Table 1 shows that there are 2.7 million households in Finland. Almost half of them live in 
blocks of flats, making it the most common building type. Of all the building types, blocks 
of flats do not fulfill most likely the accessibility criteria for the physically restricted. Blocks 
of flats have two or more floors, whereas the rest of the building types can have only one 
floor. Without a lift, multiple floors in a building can become an issue thus moving between 
them requires more effort compared to moving on the same floor. The required amount of 
effort may exceed the capabilities of the physically restricted. As age increases, it the 
probabilities to become a physically restricted increases.  
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Table 2 – Number of Tenants and Dwellings by Building Type 
 Buildings Dwellings Tenants 
Tenants over 
65 years old 
 Total Without a lift Total Without a lift Without a lift Without a lift 
Less than three floors 19 000 19 000 252 000 252 000 344 000 69 000 
Three floors 18 000 15 000 356 000 274 000 374 000 75 000 
More than three floors 25 000 2 000 630 000 58 000 79 000 16 000 
Total number 61 000 36 000 1 238 000 584 000 797 000 160 000 
       
       
Three or more floors 43 000 17 000 986 000 332 000 453 000 91 000 
This table shows the estimated number different types of blocks of flats, dwellings in them, and tenants in 
them. The table is calculated based on Official Statistics Finland (2019) and report of Kotilainen et al. (2016). 
The italic figures are explicitly received from these sources. The non-italic figures have been extrapolated after 
imposing additional assumptions6.  
 
Table 2 shows the number of residential blocks of flats that could be converted accessible 
with lift installations. It shows the number of dwellings and tenants in different types of 
blocks of flats. I have divided blocks of flats with respect to number of floors (2, 3, 3+) and 
lift. Hereby, we have six different building types.  
There are 61 thousand block of flats, of which almost half of them do not have lifts. However, 
buildings with more than two floors are eligible for the lift subsidy. Consequently, 17 
thousand buildings could be installed with lifts. From the 17 000 buildings, almost 90 percent 
are three-floor buildings. The vast majority of all the three-floor buildings do not have lifts. 
On the contrary, only circa 10 percent of the 17 000 buildings have four of more floors. 
Based on the table 2, most of the upcoming lift installations could be expected being 
conducted in blocks of flats with exactly three floors. Dwellings -columns show the number 
of dwellings with respect to the six building types. One third of all dwellings that are eligible 
for the lift subsidy do not have lifts.  
Tenants -column shows the total number of tenants with respect to the previously presented 
building types. The column shows that almost 800 thousand people are currently living in 
                                                 
6   
1) Three floor buildings include on average 20 dwellings. This figure is the same as the average amount of 
dwellings in blocks of flats Finland 
2) Buildings have constant amount of dwellings and stairways at each floor level. Hence, the only source of 
variation in the number of dwellings between blocks of flats would be the amount of floors. 
3) Average amount of floors in over three floor blocks of flats is 5 
4) Average amount of floors in less than three floor buildings is 2 
5) Household dwelling units is the same as number of dwellings 
6) Average household size is 1.36 across buildings. 1.36 is calculated from three floor buildings: 374 000 tenants / 
274 000 dwellings = 1.36 tenants / dwelling 
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blocks of flats without a lift. More than half of them live in buildings, which have three or 
more floors. The last column shows that 160 thousand over 65 years old people live in 
buildings that do not have lifts. Of them, 91 thousand people live in buildings that were 
eligible for the lift subsidy. 
Without the lift installations, part7 of the 160 000 people may become trapped in their homes 
in short-term8 perspective. Alternatively, they need to move to accessible housing. In long-
term perspective, part of  797 000 people may become trapped in their homes if they are not 
relocated to accessible housing.  
 
3.2. LIFT SUBSIDY 
The Finnish legislation (korjausavustuslaki 1087/2016) determines that the purpose of the 
lift subsidy is to remove obstacles that harm moving inside the building. The most important 
criterion for the subsidy is that the building must become accessible ex-post the installation. 
The accessibility means removal of obstacles when moving between floors. Residential 
blocks of flats that have over two floors and no previously installed lift can apply the subsidy. 
The subsidy covers nowadays 45 percent at maximum9 of the lift installation costs. However, 
the subsidy percentage has varied between 40 to 50 percent between 2000-2020. In 2016, 
the subsidy per lift was 109 000 euros on average, and 219 lifts were subsidized in total. 
On contrary to the nationwide subsidy, the municipalities differ in terms of granting 
additional subsidies. Table 3 shows the differences among the municipalities.  Of the 25 
largest municipalities, Oulu subsidizes lift installations the most (20%). Furthermore, 
Tampere and Kuopio are also generous with 15% subsidies. From the rest of the 
municipalities examined, roughly half gives 10% subsidy, while the others don´t subsidize 
the installations at all. Exceptions are Turku, and Mikkeli, who use fixed subsidy instead of 
the percentage-based subsidy. On top of the direct monetary subsidies, some municipalities 
offer free advisory service for the housing condominiums when they are considering the lift 
installation. Moreover, the municipalities´ subsidies may have varied between 2000-2018. 
                                                 
7 The portion depends on how many live in the lowest floor. The lowest floor in block of flat building can be 
accessible without a lift. 
8 Short-term refers likely somewhere between 0-15 years. Within the age cohort of over 65 years old, the 
number of people decreases as the age increases. Hence, annually a number of people become physically 
restricted, and the number likely increases until the whole cohort are physically restricted. 
9 In practice, no lift application receives smaller than maximum percentage subsidy from ARA, unless the 
application is rejected (Merilä, 2020). 
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Table 3 – Lift Installation Subsidy by Municipality 
 Subsidy % Fixed subsidy per lift (€) 
   
Helsinki 10 0 
Espoo 10 0 
Tampere 15 0 
Vantaa 10 0 
Oulu 20 0 
Turku 0 5 000 
Jyväskylä 10 0 
Lahti 10 0 
Kuopio 15 0 
Pori 10 0 
Kouvola 0 0 
Joensuu 10 0 
Lappeenranta 0 0 
Hämeenlinna 0 0 
Vaasa 10 0 
Seinäjoki 0 0 
Rovaniemi 0 0 
Mikkeli 0 15 000 
Kotka 0 0 
Salo 0 0 
Porvoo 0 0 
Kokkola 0 0 
Hyvinkää 0 0 
Lohja 0 0 
Järvenpää 0 0 
Notes: The table is based on the interview with Merilä (2020). It includes the largest municipalities in Finland 
based on the number on citizens. 
 
3.3. PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLICY 
The nationwide lift subsidy is a part of policy interventions that aim to increase accessible 
housing supply. The set of the policy interventions consists of legal requirements, public 
housing production, and subsidies (income transfers). For example, in 2005 it became 
mandatory to install lifts to new blocks of flats (Kotilainen et al., 2016). Publicly owned 
housing companies construct and offer accessible apartments for rental purposes. The lift 
subsidy is an income transfer from society to the housing condominiums who decide to 
install a lift. The policy interventions can be analyzed with cost-benefit analyses (CBA)10. 
The basic intuition behind the analysis is that if all benefits in the society exceed the costs, 
the policy creates positive net benefit. If the net benefit of the project (or subsidy program) 
                                                 
10 Boardman et. al (2017) have written a cornerstone textbook for the subject: Cost-Benefit Analysis: 
Concepts and Practice 
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exceeds the net benefit from the alternative options, the project should be funded. The 
(implicit) assumption is that total benefit is a sum of individual utilities, which are often 
measured in terms of monetary units. 
Normally, the competitive markets allocate goods (such as lift installations) for those who 
are willing to pay the most for it. This is also an efficient outcome for society, thus it 
maximizes the net utilities. The lift subsidy decreases the lift installation market price thus 
increasing the amount of installations.  
I divide the costs of the policy to direct and indirect costs. The direct costs for the society 
have been annually around 100 thousand euros per lift (ARA 2017). With 200 lifts, the 
annual cost is 20 million euros. The indirect costs are harder to identify. I identified two 
indirect sources, but they are even harder to quantify. First source comes from deadweight 
losses. Income transfers are financed via taxation thus creating deadweight losses from 
markets they are collected. However, the marginal increase for nationwide tax rates due to 
the lift subsidy are presumably close to zero11. Consequently, the costs from deadweight 
losses are small. Second, health care costs may increase if the healthy start using lifts instead 
of walking stairs. Walking stairs increases everyday physical exercise, thus avoiding many 
diseases caused by a bad lifestyle. However, it would require extensive research to measure 
the magnitude of both of the effects. 
Even though there are identified direct and indirect costs, the policy may be socially 
beneficial due to positive externalities. Kotilainen et al. (2016) identified two types of 
positive externalities related to increased accessibility. First, the risk of accidents, such as 
falling decreases, as there are less obstacles when moving between floors. Finland has a 
public medical insurance, which covers bone fractures and similar injuries. Consequently, 
the society pays all the injuries, which can be costly. Second, it can increase the amount of 
living in own home by 6-8 years. Enabling the elderly to live accessible life in own home is 
considered to increase the utility for everyone in society. The magnitude is hard to quantify, 
but I have not seen any disagreements that this target would be valuable.  
The benefits depend on how well the subsidy receives those who would not have otherwise 
moved to accessible housing due to their budget constraints. Some intervals for the share of 
                                                 
11 20 million euros would be 0.03% of total budgeted government expenses for year 2020 (Ministry of 
Finance, 2020). 
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receiver12 estimates can be imposed. If everyone in a building had tight budget constraints, 
the lift installation would help all of them. The subsequent tenants would also benefit from 
the subsidy, as lifts are one-time investments. Hereby, the share of receiver would be over 
100%. On the other hand, if all of the current and the subsequent tenants were wealthy 
enough to move accessible housing, the share would be 0%. If we assumed a) the current 
share of the physically restricted without wealthy to move being 20%, b) 20 tenants in a 
building, and c) three rounds of new tenants, the share of receivers would be 60% and the 
number of receivers would be 12. For those, if the subsidized lift installation increased 
accessible life by six years, a subsidized lift installation would provide in total 72 years of 
accessible life. If everyone in Finland appreciated accessible life so that they would receive 
utility worth of 1€ / accessible year for other person, the simplified net benefit of the subsidy 
would be over 431 million euros13. The previous net benefit calculation is based on fragile 
assumptions, and it should be considered only as giving an initial framework for the cost-
benefit analysis problem related to the lift subsidy. Consequently, it would require further 
research, before a monetary amount of the true net benefits could be published. 
If the existing blocks of flats were not converted accessible with lift subsidies, alternative 
options seem to be even more expensive. First, society could subsidize new housing stock 
construction, and then allocate it to the elderly. The average cost new housing construction 
for Ara has been around 3000 €/m2 in the recent years (ARA, 2017). Hereby, it costs almost 
100 000€ to construct a new apartment with 33 m2 living area. Second, society could allocate 
the existing accessible housing stock for the elderly. One form of the existing accessible 
housing is a retirement home. Merilä (2020) approximates the retirement home costs being 
40 000€ per year per tenant, making it likely a more expensive option compared to the first 
one.  
On contrast to the alternative options, subsidizing a lift in an expensive scenario14 costs 
approximately 10 000€ per apartment for society. According to this simplified calculation, 
lift subsidy costs only one tenth compared to fully subsidized construction of new housing 
stock. However, the alternative options have likely a higher share of receiver, because 
society can decide to allocate the housing for those who truly have tight budget constraints. 
                                                 
12 The current and all the subsequent tenants with budget restrictions and need for accessible housing divided 
by total amount of tenants in a building 
13 Benefit is 1€ * 6 million people * 72 years = 432 000 000. Cost from the subsidy is 100 000€. I exclude 
time value of money from the simplified estimate. 
14 Assuming a lift converts 10 dwellings accessible. Cost per lift is 200 000€. Subsidy per lift is 50% 
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Still, the alternative options only enable living in accessible housing, but not living in own 
home. Society likely receives more utility if the people are enabled living accessible life in 
own home compared to living accessible life in a random house.  
Another possible externality that was not covered above, is wealth equality. The people in 
the society may receive utility if total wealth is distributed equally among the citizens. If the 
subsidy was given mainly for the rich, this objective would fail. The descriptive findings of 
this study mitigates that concern. The dwellings that are in blocks of flats without a lift, cost 
30 percent less than dwellings in blocks of flats with a lift (table 13). It would be reasonable 
to assume that one´s wealth would correlate with value of his/hers dwelling. Hence, the 
apartment owners living in a building without a lift, are less likely rich compared to living 
in buildings with lifts. However, there could be exceptions from the expected correlation 
between wealth level and having a lift in a building. Near CBD in Helsinki, there are areas15 
with high dwelling prices, but they may not have a lift because they were built in the 19th 
century. The concern of lift subsidy recipients being from the rich areas is mitigated by table 
4. It shows than only one third of the housing condominiums with lift installations are from 
Helsinki. Thus, the subsidy seems to have higher changes increase wealth equality rather 
than increase inequality. 
To conclude, a part of 160 000 people may become trapped in their homes in short-term if 
their dwellings are not converted accessible or they do not relocate to accessible housing. 
The society has multiple tools to prevent the scenario. One tool is to increase the lift 
installations by subsidizing lift installations. The net costs and benefits are difficult to 
quantify. However, the lift subsidy seems better than an alternative option, which is  
subsidizing new housing stock construction. The lift subsidy is likely used by those, who 
live in less valuable apartments. Consequently, the lift subsidy could increase wealth 
equality in Finland. 
  
                                                 
15 Such as Ullanlinna, Eira, and Katajanokka 
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4. DATA  
I use a dataset consisting of roughly half a million dwelling transactions in blocks of flats 
between 2000-2018 around Finland. Each observation (transaction) can contain 36 variables. 
The data is not balanced, meaning that there are no observations for each time period for 
each apartment. Thus, the dataset could be interpreted as a repeated cross-section data. The 
data is gathered from KVKL, which is a consortium of real estate brokers (Central Federation 
of Real Estate Agencies in Finland). It collects all the apartment transactions that are made 
with assistance of a broker belonging to the consortium. The majority (according to the 
representative of the agency) of all dwelling transactions are recorded to the dataset. I start 
this section by analyzing the data quality and identifying the main concerns with it. Then, I 
describe how I have identified buildings with lift installations, because it is crucial in my 
main empirical model. Last, I show supporting evidence for my building identification using 
the official statistics from ARA. 
4.1. QUALITY OF THE DATA 
I categorize the quality of the data consisting of two elements: representativeness of the 
dwelling prices and attributes, and the information precision. In an ideal world, all the prices 
from each dwelling would be updated every moment similarly to stock markets. 
Furthermore, there would be an exhaustive list of attributes for each dwelling. Hence, even 
a subtle change in some variable, let´s say painting of interior wall, should lead to price 
change immediately after the public16 knows about the new repair. Second, the precision of 
the data measures the amount and distribution of measurement errors. The more observations 
are measured falsely, the lower is the precision. If the distribution of the errors is distributed 
evenly around the true figure, we have a classical measurement error. Classical error in 
outcome variable (price) would affect only the magnitude of standard errors in the estimates. 
However, if there is a classical measurement error in the independent variable, the estimates 
become attenuated. If the error distribution is skewed, we have a non-classical measurement 
error. For instance, observations could be systematically higher than true. In the outcome 
variable, this would not affect my results. However, in the independent variable, systematical 
errors may lead to biased estimates.  
                                                 
16  According to Perfect Markets Hypothesis, the price of an asset resembles all the information that exists 
and relates to it (Fama, Fisher, Jensen, & Roll, 1969). In the stock markets, the empirics support the 
theorem constantly. 
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Poor representativeness can harm the interpretation of the results due to selection bias, and 
the lack of exhaustive listing of apartment characteristics can bring omitted variable bias 
affecting the interpretation of causality. The poor precision of information (due to 
measurement error for example) may lead to attenuated or false estimates.  
Selection bias could occur due to transaction data characteristics that prevail in every study. 
Alternatively, selection bias could occur from the study specific data. The underlying reason 
for the first factor is that the data covers only transactions. Transactions at this type of real 
estate markets are rare, because they emerge only if the tenant is willing to sell the apartment, 
and other person finds the apartment suitable for her. In the literature, this process is called 
matching17. Hence, the data omits all the potential transactions, where someone would like 
to buy a share of apartment, but is not able to do so, because the owner is not willing to sell 
the apartment. An application of this reasoning relates to lift installation. If the lift 
installation would increase only the tenants´ willingness to pay, the apartment price increase 
would not be recorded just because the apartment will not be on sale. The data could omit 
the highest (or lowest) treatment effects. However, this issue prevails everywhere when 
someone is dealing with real estate transaction data, and the hedonic pricing literature does 
not seem to address the issue often.  
Second, some fraction of the transactions are not recorded to the dataset. If the transactions 
that are made without assistance of a real estate broker belonging to KVKL consortium differ 
systematically from the other transaction, the sample is not representative of all dwelling 
transactions conducted in old blocks of flats. Though, this should not be a critical source of 
bias. All the old dwellings in blocks of flats are already quite homogenous in general, and 
the main purpose of this research is to find only the average price effect of lift installation.  
Lack of attributes (variables) within each observation could create omitted variable bias. The 
largest threat arises if the dataset omits crucial factors that correlates with our independent 
variable (lift installation). The potential correlation would create bias for the results. 
Example of this kind of factor could be long-term maintenance plan. The maintenance plan 
gives valuable information to the buyer, because it could reveal increasing maintenance costs 
for the tenants. If the maintenance plan information would correlate with lift installation, my 
results would become biased, thus the treatment effect would include changes in the long-
term plan. Other crucial omitted variables are the lack of official building identification code 
                                                 
17 Coles & Smith (1998) provide an excellent view on the matching process 
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and stairway identification letter18. I deal with this by creating a proxy for the former, and 
imposing assumptions for the latter one. 
The imprecise information may bring significant issues for the research. In my case, this is 
one of the main challenges thus the brokers enter the data manually and they do not have 
significant monetary incentives to pay attention to the input of the data after a transaction. 
Especially, the important dummy variables, such as lift dummy is extremely sensitive for 
creating bias in the estimates in case of false entry. In the following section, I cover how I 
have dealt with these problems. Moreover, it is almost impossible to proof whether the 
measurement errors are classical or systematical in my case. I do not find evidence that the 
brokers would have incentives to over- or underestimate the variables. Thus, I assume all 
measurement errors classical. 
Even though I listed multiple deviations from an ideal world, the data fits well for my study. 
The number of observations is large and the variables are exhaustive yielding a good 
representativeness for transactions in blocks of flats. The information precision is more 
difficult to assess, but the data unlikely contains non-classical measurement errors.  
4.2. DATA TREATMENT 
My empirical strategy requires identifying treatment status for all the observations. 
Treatment group consists of all dwellings that are in buildings, where lifts will be (or were) 
installed. The control group consists of all other observations. Hereby, I need to identify 
buildings, which were installed with lifts between 2000-2018. There are some challenges for 
the group- and treatment identification. First, the data do not explicitly reveal precise 
identification codes for buildings. Second, the data do not contain information about the 
stairway of the apartment. Third, there is no explicit information about the lift construction 
year. My strategy is to identify buildings based on the variables that presumably stay 
constant, and compare lift-status in all of transactions conducted in each building. The 
variables that are expected to stay constant are postal code, street name, street number, year 
                                                 
18 In Finland, post address is most often used in informing dwelling location. An example of post address is 
Muurarinkuja 1 B 12. In this example Muurarinkuja is the street, 1 is number of the street, B informs the 
stairway, and 12 is the dwelling number. My data omits stairway letter and dwelling number. 
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of construction, and number of floors. Moreover, I have removed outliers19 and obvious20 
errors from the data. 
Using the building identification method, I divided the buildings into two categories based 
on how lift is reported in each transaction. The first category consists of buildings, where 
the lift-status stays constant. Either all of the transactions in a building report having a lift, 
or all of the transactions report missing lift. The first category is the control group. The 
second category consist of buildings, where lift-status changes. Treatment group building is 
identified if a building has first transactions without a lift, and all of the rest transactions 
report the existence of a lift. Hence, the transaction-data has implied a lift installation for 
those buildings. From the second category, a large number of buildings report transactions 
first with a lift, and later without a lift. Because it is not reasonable to assume a lift removal 
from a building, these observations are removed from the sample. Nearly half of all 
observations are removed. Next, I will discuss about the potential causes of the observation 
removal how it affects the interpretation of the upcoming results. 
Firstly, there could be instances when two different buildings have the same street number, 
construction year, and number of floors. If the other building has a lift, while the second do 
not have, both of the buildings will likely end up removed from the sample. In addition, I 
assume that all the stairways in a building either have – or don´t have lifts. Merilä (2020) 
argued that, this assumption would hold in “most of the cases”. If one stairway in a building 
receives a lift while the others don´t, all transactions in this building will also be likely 
removed. Finally, the brokers enter the data manually. If they have by accident report falsely 
the lift-status, all of the observations in that building will be likely removed. The observation 
dropping affects increase concern of non-random selection thus affecting the external 
validity of the results. The manual entry of the data likely creates selection, that omits 
buildings with high transaction volume. If the probability for data entry error is constant, the 
more likely the high transaction volume building has at least one falsely entered lift-status 
compared to low transaction volume buildings.  
Besides the concern of creating non-random selection, one could ask if the treatment group 
identification is also coincidence of the abovementioned reasons. To decrease this concern, 
                                                 
19 Outliers by variable: 1) unencumbered sale price is less than 2000€ or over 1 000 000€. 2) number of 
rooms is over 13. 3) floor number over 20. 4) maintenance charge is over 2000€ / month.  
20 Obvious errors are: 1) Number of floors is less than 2. 2) Sale year is over 2019. 3) Number of rooms, or 
floors are not integers or they have negative values. 
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I show that the number of assumed lifts is close to the actual number of lifts installed. To do 
this, I use the findings from Kotilainen & al, (2016), who used data directly from ARA, 
which presumably is close to the exact figures. 
Figure 1 – The Precision of Estimated Number of Lift Installations 
  
 
Notes: Helsinki is excluded from the graph. If a municipality lies directly at the 45 Degree Line, the amount of 
buildings with lift installations are the same according to both sources. 
 
Figure 1 supports my building identification strategy. It shows, that the implied lift buildings 
from the transaction data is similar what found in their report for the Ministry of 
Environment. The municipalities lying at the 45 Degree Line have identical amount of lift 
installations. The municipalities that lie above the line (such as Lahti), have according to my 
data more lift installations compared to ARA-data and the same vice versa for the 
municipalities lying below the line. The figure excludes Helsinki, because the numbers for 
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lift installations are extraordinary high: my data implies 418 buildings that have an installed  
lift, whereas Kotilainen & Al, (2016) identified 749 buildings with installed lifts.  
Even though figure 1 is created to proxy the precision of the data, the datasets have natural 
reasons to be different. Firstly, the time periods differ. My data is from 2000 to 2018, 
whereas the ARA-data used by Kotilainen & Al, (2016) counts buildings between 2003-
2015. Secondly, my data contains only transactions conducted by the real estate brokers. 
Thus, it omits all the lift installations made in buildings that are outside this scope: For 
example, municipality owned housing companies21 are typical buyers of lift installations 
Merilä (2020), and they are excluded in my data. Third, the ARA-data used by Kotilainen 
et. al (2016) includes only subsidized installations. The unsubsidized are excluded, whereas 
my data should reveal all the installations in despite of the potential permitted subsidies. 
Merilä (2020) do not find this to be an issue. He stated that in practice, a vast majority the 
applied subsidies for lift installations are accepted. 
To conclude, the manual entry of the data, and lack of explicit information regarding lifts 
and building identification brought concerns for validity of this research. I mitigated the 
concerns by showing that the amount of buildings with lift installations by municipality 
correlates well with previous research. 
4.3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the key variables for the treatment- and control 
groups. Treatment group consists of observations from buildings that have a lift installation. 
Control group22 consists of all other observations. The groups have been categorized to 
transactions and buildings. Transactions -columns contain means of the variables for the 
observations in the dataset, whereas the building-level is first averaged for each building, 
and then gathered the means for each variables. The building-level comparison is relevant 
when considering differences between buildings with- and without lift installations. 
  
                                                 
21 For instance, 13% of all inhabitants in Helsinki live in apartment owned by a municipality owned housing 
company HEKA.  
22 Alternatively, control group could be consisted of only buildings that never have lifts. In appendix, the 
summary statistics for the alternative control groups are provided.  
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Table 4 –  Descriptive Statistics  
 Control Group Treatment Group 
Variable 
Mean of 
Transaction 
Mean of 
Building 
Mean of 
Transaction 
Mean of 
Building 
Municipality (0/1)    
Other 50.3 % 47.6 % 44.8 % 42.5 % 
Helsinki 20.6 % 22.0 % 27.4 % 27.8 % 
Tampere 7.2 % 7.2 % 5.3 % 6.0 % 
Oulu 3.4 % 3.9 % 4.1 % 4.1 % 
Espoo 4.1 % 3.6 % 3.8 % 4.4 % 
Lahti 3.6 % 4.0 % 4.2 % 4.1 % 
Kuopio 2.8 % 3.1 % 3.5 % 4.0 % 
Turku 4.7 % 5.7 % 3.6 % 3.9 % 
Jyväskylä 3.2 % 2.9 % 3.2 % 3.2 %      
Building Characteristics    
Lift (0/1) 19.5 % 34.9 % 51.6 % 53.4 % 
Construction Year 1969 1 968 1 971 1 972 
Age 40.9 41.1 39.2 38.4 
Number of Floors 3.6 4.1 4.6 4.9 
     
Dwelling Characteristics    
Price (€) 113 202 127 210 151 266 164 804 
Price (€/m2) 2 021 2 190 2 525 2 695 
Living Area 57 58 60 61 
Number of Rooms 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 
Maintenance Charge (€) 172 169 183 186 
Floor Level 2.3 2.5 2.8 2.9      
Apartment condition, Broker estimate (0/1)   
Unknown 10.1 % 9.6 % 8.4 % 7.5 % 
Poor 2.8 % 3.0 % 2.8 % 2.4 % 
Decent 30.3 % 29.2 % 27.6 % 26.1 % 
Good 56.6 % 57.7 % 60.2 % 62.5 % 
Excellent 0.3 % 0.4 % 1.0 % 1.5 % 
     
Observations 262 525 66 116 8 056 1 595 
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The municipalities describes how large fraction of the observations are in each municipality. 
Only the municipalities that had over 5023 lift installations during the time period are 
separated as their own categories. Rest of the municipalities are aggregated with a label 
Other.  Helsinki is the most popular municipality in terms all transactions and lift 
installations. Slightly more one fifth of transactions are conducted in Helsinki.  
The second category is the building characteristics. Lift -variable shows how large portion 
of transactions or buildings have a lift. 19.5% of control group transactions have a lift, while 
over 34% of buildings in the control group have a lift. The interpretation for this difference 
is that the buildings without a lift are more often transacted compared to their relative 
existing amount. A half of the transactions in the treatment group have lifts. This means that 
almost equal amount of transactions have been conducted before lift installation and after 
lift installation. Another interesting finding is found from number of floors -variable. It 
shows that the low floor buildings have more transactions compared to high floor buildings. 
The finding could be explained by the previously explained selection issue regarding the 
building identification. Because the high transaction volume buildings are more likely 
excluded, they high floor buildings may as well be excluded if the height correlated with 
transaction volume. 
The apartment specific characteristics show that the treatment group apartments are more 
prestigious compared to the control group apartments. Two variables could explain the price 
difference: Floor level is usually higher in treatment group apartments and apartment 
condition is better in the treatment group.  
At the bottom of the table, number of observations are provided. The control group has circa 
263 000 transactions, whereas the treatment group has c. 8 000 transactions. The control 
group consists of c. 66 000 buildings, while there are 1 595 buildings with lift installations. 
Hence, there has been 4-5 transactions in each building. The combined amount of buildings 
(c. 67 600) exceeds the estimated number of buildings represented in table 2. The figure in 
the summary statistics should intuitively be lower, because not all existing block of flats in 
Finland have transactions recorded to the KVKL -dataset. Hence, summary statistics are 
likely overestimating the amount of buildings. This is likely caused by manual entry of the 
                                                 
23 The number has been chosen quite arbitrarily. It tries to maximize number of municipalities, and also to be 
big enough for receiving large enough number of observations.  
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data by the real estate brokers. Even a single misspelling24 in street address leads to different 
building identification codes. Even though there is unfortunate inconsistency between the 
tables, I do not find it being a crucial for the internal validity of this study. The most crucial 
part is to identify buildings with a changed lift-status. With the assumed misspellings for 
some street addresses, a “lower than true” number of buildings with lift installations are 
identified. This would likely lead to a small attenuation bias in the estimates of lift 
installations on dwelling prices. A small portion of the treated apartments are falsely in the 
control group. 
4.4. LIFT INSTALLATIONS ON A MAP 
For an illustrative purpose, I plotted a map of lift installations. The map below shows the 
distribution of the 1595 buildings with lift installations that I identified from the transaction 
data. I find two worth-of-mention -aspects from the figure: all the large municipalities have 
buildings with lift installations. In addition, the areas around the cities have lift installations 
as well. The first notions tells us that the need for lift installation is not area-specific. Second, 
there seems to be a need for accessibility is countrywide wherever there are blocks of flats. 
                                                 
24 Let´s say two transactions are conducted in street address called Aleksis Kiven katu 17. If the other broker 
spells it as Aleksis-Kiven katu 17, we end up identifying two different buildings. 
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Figure 2 – Heat Map of Buildings With Installed Lifts Between 2000-2018
 
Notes: The underlying data for constructing the map is apartment transaction data by Central Federation of 
Real Estate Brokers in Finland.  
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5. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
5.1. DIFFERENCE IN DIFFERENCES 
I use two way fixed effects difference in differences -model (TWFE DID) to create a ceteris 
paribus where only lift would affect the price of an apartment. The model is augmented with 
control variables from the hedonic pricing model.  
Let us briefly start with the traditional difference in differences -model. The setup consists 
of two groups (treatment- and control groups) and two time periods (before- and after 
treatment). The outcomes of the groups are expected to evolve similarly with respect to time 
with absence of treatment. This parallel trends -assumption enables to find a counterfactual 
outcome25 for the treated group. The traditional approach is referred in the recent literature 
as canonical DID or 2x2 DID (e.g. Goodman-Bacon, 2018). The canonical DID was utilized 
for example in the famous study by Card and Krueger with Mariel Boatlift (1990), which 
estimated the impact of immigration wave on minimum wages.  
On contrast to the 2x2 DID, my setup consists of multiple periods and multiple units treated 
at different times. Each year between 2000-2018, some number of lifts has been installed. 
However, the econometric literature in social sciences is relatively young26 with dealing this 
types of problems. Two way fixed effects (TWFE) DID and event study DID are commonly 
used in handling DID setups with multiple treatment groups and periods. TWFE DID is often 
determined by: 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝜕𝜕𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (6) 
Where 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 refers to unit dummies and 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 to time dummies, and 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is indicator of being in 
treatment group after the beginning of treatment. This equation could be augmented with 
vector of control variables 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. Coefficient 𝜕𝜕27 represents the difference in differences effect 
due to treatment. For interpreting 𝜕𝜕 as unbiased estimator of the average treatment effect on 
the treated, it also requires parallel trends -assumption for all the 2x2 estimators of the model. 
                                                 
25 Counterfactual is an imaginary outcome without a treatment.  
26 Apparently, TWFE was recognized in textbook in 2005 by Cameron & Trivedi. Another textbook in 2015 
by Angrist & Pischke covered the issue of multiple treatment periods (Goodman-Bacon, 2018).  
27 The estimation of the coefficient has received attention recently. For instance, Baker (2019), and 
Goodman-Bacon (2018) say that even though the TWFE DID is used widely in the empirical literature, 
actually a little is known of the coefficient estimation. They show that the coefficient consists of multiple 2x2 
-coefficients, that are calculated for each treatment times separately. There 2x2 -coefficients are weighted 
with their relative importance. Their conclusion is that 𝜕𝜕 -coefficient is variance-weighted TWFE DID -
coefficient, and it is equal to average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) if the treatment effect is same in 
all of the 2x2 coefficients. 
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The parallel trend assumption for all the 2x2 estimators is a bit tricky to confirm. However, 
more credibility can be obtained by enriching the treatment*after (𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) to a vector of 
interaction dummies (treatment*time relative to treatment). If we see that on average, the 
differences in outcomes for the treatment and control groups do not change before the 
treatment, we can have more confidence that the assumption holds well enough. By 
enriching the interaction, the model is referred as event study DID. The event study enables 
also to find potential anticipation effects. If the markets would receive information about lift 
installation some years prior the installation, the treatment effect should be visible at the time 
of the announcement. 
The event study -models have somewhat similar structure compared to the TWFE -models: 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + � 𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙−2
𝑙𝑙=−𝐾𝐾
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + �𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿
𝑙𝑙=0
𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (7) 
Once again, we have unit-, and time fixed effects, and vector of control variables. 
∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙
−2
𝑙𝑙=−𝐾𝐾 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=0 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is representation for being in treatment group in  K years before 
the beginning of treatment, to L years after treatment, while the omitted category is year -1. 
The omitted group consists of group without treatment and the group being in treatment 
group at time -1. Hence, the interpretation of each 𝜇𝜇𝑙𝑙 -coefficients tells what is the difference 
of outcomes between the groups each year relative to beginning of treatment.  
I augment the  empirical model with vector of control variables provided by the hedonic 
pricing literature and my dataset. Sirmans et al., (2005) list the most popular attributes that 
have been used in the hedonic pricing regressions. Table 5 combines the most common 
variables used in the hedonic models, and shows how they are controlled in this study. I have 
omitted fireplace, number of bathrooms, air-conditioning, pool, brick, and deck, due to the 
excessive amount of missing values in the KVKL dataset. Furthermore, many of these 
variables are not that relevant for this study. Examples of irrelevant control variables are 
fireplaces and pools thus they are extremely rare in the Finnish dwellings in blocks of flats. 
It would be hard to imagine that these variables would be correlated with lift-variable thus 
bringing omitted variable bias.   
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Table 5 - The most Common Variables used in The Hedonic Pricing Models 
Variable Among top 20 most popular variables 
# Appearances 
in the previous 
literature 
Controlled in this study 
Age Yes 78 Independent Variable 
Square feet Yes 69 Independent Variable 
Garage Spaces Yes 61 Building Fixed effects 
Fireplace Yes 57 No 
Lot Size Yes 52 Building Fixed effects 
# Of bathrooms Yes 40 No 
Bedrooms Yes 40 Independent Variable 
Full Baths Yes 37 No 
Air-Conditioning Yes 37 No 
Pool Yes 31 No 
Basement Yes 21 Building Fixed effects 
Time On Market Yes 18 Year Fixed effects 
Distance Yes 15 Building Fixed effects 
# Rooms Yes 14 Independent Variable 
Brick Yes 13 No 
# Stories Yes 13 Independent Variable 
Time Trend Yes 13 Year Fixed effects 
Ln Lot Size Yes 12 No 
Ln Square feet Yes 12 No 
Deck Yes 12 No 
Apartment 
Condition 
No 1 Independent Variable 
Lift No N/A Independent Variable 
Notes: The table shows the most used variables in hedonic pricing literature based on findings of Sirmans et 
al. (2005) and how the variables are controlled in this study. 
 
Besides the listed variables, the structural form of the regression is emphasized in the 
literature. The consensus is that semi-log form is the most commonly used thus it gives easy 
interpretation for the attribute effects on housing prices ((Chau & Chin, 2003; Goodman, 
1998; Keskin, 2008; Sheppard, 1999; Sirmans et al., 2005). The logarithm of price is the 
dependent variable, whereas the literature (Table 5) shows the most important independent 
variables. With the abovementioned form, the independent variable coefficients are ought to 
be interpreted as percent effects on dwelling prices. 
5.2. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND EMPIRICAL MODELS 
I impose three research questions: 1. How much the dwelling prices increase due to lift 
installations? Additionally, I change the outcome variable as sale time (see figure 4 in 
appendix).  Because it is reasonable to assume a lift being more beneficial for the higher 
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floor tenants compared to lower floors, the second question is 2. What is the treatment 
effect across the floor levels? Furthermore, because the municipalities have different 
policies regarding the additional lift subsidies, the third question is 3. How does the 
treatment effect vary across municipalities?  
For the first research question, I use the event-study -and TWFE DID models which are 
augmented by controls hedonic pricing model. I also change the unit fixed effects being at 
postcode, and street -levels for robustness. Hence, the main equation for my models is: 
 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝜕𝜕0𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝜕𝜕1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (8) 
Where I explain the logarithm of unencumbered sales price for apartment i in location j at 
time t.  I vary the location fixed effects from postcode to street, and finally to building level. 
At the building level28 fixed effects, the model becomes TWFE DID. Hence, the coefficient  
𝜕𝜕1 gives the effect of installing a lift on apartment prices. It is a weighted average of all the 
2x2 DID estimators, where the treatment groups consists of all apartments that are located 
in buildings where a lift is installed at the same year. The control group consists observations 
from all other blocks of flats. I also run the model with event study format to find any 
potential anticipation effects. 
The model of my second research question has similar structure than the previous one: 
 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝜕𝜕0𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓+ 𝜕𝜕1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡𝑓𝑓 ∗ 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛿𝛿𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (9) 
However, the vector of coefficients 𝜕𝜕0 determine differences before lift installation at each 
floor in the treatment group compared to control group. 𝜕𝜕1 coefficients show the difference 
in differences after treatment. The model for the third question is the same as the first, except 
I run it by each municipality.  
                                                 
28 Note, that according to equation (6) the unit (location) fixed effects should be for each apartment. 
However, the deviation should not affect the results. If the location fixed effects were at apartment level, the 
treatment group would be the same as with building level, and the treatment status would also change at the 
same time for all the units. Also with building fixed effects, 𝜕𝜕0𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 drops out, and the model looks 
familiar to the equation (6). 
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6. RESULTS 
I start this chapter by showing descriptive connection between lifts and apartment prices. I 
continue by answering the first research question with the event study and TWFE DID  -
models. I vary the location fixed effects in all of the models to find how robust the results 
are. For the second and third research question, I use only TWFE DID models.  
6.1. DESCRIPTIVE EFFECT 
I show first how a descriptive connection between lift and dwelling prices by increasing the 
amount of controls in the model. All the models in table 6 are ordinary least squares (OLS) 
without location fixed effects. 
Table 6 – Descriptive effect 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OLS 1 OLS 2 OLS 3 
    
Lift (0/1) 0.311*** 0.319*** 0.0183*** 
 (0.00300) (0.00286) (0.00351) 
Constant 11.36*** 10.89*** 10.84*** 
 (0.00136) (0.0106) (0.0452) 
    
Observations 270,581 270,581 270,581 
R-squared 0.038 0.129 0.486 
Structural Controls NO NO YES 
Year FE NO YES YES 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
The first model compares the mean of dwelling prices with lifts to mean of dwelling prices 
without lifts. The model suggest that dwellings with lifts are around 30% more valuable 
compared to other apartments. However, as discussed in the previous sections, we cannot 
conclude the price difference being caused of the lifts. When the model is augmented with 
year fixed effects, the premium even increases a little. Furthermore, we find increase in R-
squared, which measures how much of the variation in price is explained by the independent 
variables. OLS 3 model introduces structural controls determined by hedonic pricing model. 
They consist of building- and dwelling attributes presented in table 4. After introducing those 
variables, the apartments with lifts are 1.83% more expensive compared to all other 
apartments. Moreover, the R-squared increases from 0.13 to 0.49 implying high relevance 
of the structural control variables. 
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6.2. AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECT 
Figure 3 shows how the price difference of the treatment- and control group apartments 
differ with respective to the difference of one year prior the lift installation. I vary the 
location fixed effects to get estimates from three models. 
Figure 3 – Event Study 
 
Notes: Year -6 includes observations -6 years or before. Year 6 includes 6 or later. Confidence interval is 95%. 
Standard errors are clustered at postcode level. 
 
The figure shows that the coefficients are close to zero before lift installation. This means, 
that the price difference has not changed between the treatment and control groups prior the 
lift installation, thus supporting the parallel trends assumption. Furthermore, after lift 
installation (year 1 onwards), all the coefficients increase to 1-5%, and many of them are 
statistically significant with 95% confidence interval. The results suggest consistently 
similar pre-trends between the treated apartments and untreated apartments prior lift 
installation, and increase in prices after lift installation only for apartments that were treated.  
Table 7 uses the empirical model described in equation 8 with location fixed effects varying 
from postcode to street and building levels. The building fixed effects model is interpreted 
as TWFE DID. All the models include the same structural and controls as the OLS-models. 
Year fixed effects are also included. Treatment*After –coefficient reveals the impact of lift 
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installation on prices. It has value 1 if apartment belongs to treatment group and lift is 
installed, otherwise the value is zero. The last model with building fixed effects omits the 
treatment group –dummy, because building fixed effects already control for the same issue. 
The fully reported results are in appendix in table 11. 
Table 7 – Average Treatment Effect 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Postcode FE Street FE Building FE 
    
Treatment 0.00609 -0.00554  
 (0.00690) (0.00548)  
Treatment*After 0.0274*** 0.0254*** 0.0203*** 
 (0.00792) (0.00657) (0.00727) 
Constant 10.78*** 10.76*** 9.735*** 
 (0.0670) (0.0631) (0.0700) 
    
Observations 270,581 270,581 270,581 
R-squared 0.905 0.936 0.960 
    
Structural Controls YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Postcode FE YES NO NO 
Street FE NO YES NO 
Building FE NO NO YES 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by postcode. Significance levels are 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
The lift premium is positive in every model: 2.74%, 2.54%, and 2.03% for postcode FE, 
street FE, and building FE respectively. All the coefficients have high statistical significance 
(p-value smaller than 0.01). The similar magnitude (2-3%) of the coefficients within this 
table is a signal of the robustness of the results. Furthermore, the results are in line with the 
event study model, that implied treatment effect being between 0-5%. Two percent impact 
means for average priced (150 000€) apartment three thousand euros value increase due to 
lift installation.  
 
6.1. TREATMENT EFFECT BY FLOOR 
One could argue that the main function of a lift is to avoid the need for walking stairs. A 
tenant may hence avoid costs of walking by using a lift thus receiving higher utility. If the 
tenants had the same utility preferences across the floor levels, the higher floor tenants 
should then receive higher utility from a lift installation. Hypothetically, this should be 
reflected to lift premiums across the floors.  
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Table 8 – Treatment Effect by Floor 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Postcode FE Street FE Building FE 
    
Treatment*Floor level*After     
1 0.00610 0.00714 0.00798 
 (0.0129) (0.0108) (0.0125) 
2 0.0282*** 0.0158* 0.0126 
 (0.0100) (0.00855) (0.00943) 
3 0.0234** 0.0286*** 0.0322*** 
 (0.0102) (0.00869) (0.0107) 
4 0.0463*** 0.0399*** 0.0400*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0113) (0.0107) 
5+ 0.0385** 0.0270* 0.00832 
 (0.0179) (0.0159) (0.0144) 
Constant 10.81*** 10.78*** 9.749*** 
 (0.0663) (0.0615) (0.0697) 
    
Observations 270,572 270,572 270,572 
R-squared 0.904 0.935 0.960 
Structural Controls YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by postcode. All the models include 
structural controls and year fixed effects. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Table 8 shows estimated lift premiums by floor. Treatment*Floor level*After refers to 
coefficient 𝜕𝜕1 from equation 9. In all of the three models, the treatment effect increases as 
the floor level increases until the fourth floor. The treatment effects are statistically 
insignificant at the first floor. At the second floor, the effects are between 2.8% to 1.26%. 
However, the result is statistically only with postcode FE- and street FE models. The third 
floor treatment effect is between 2.3% and 3.2% with low p-values. Treatment effect at the 
fourth floor is the highest: 4.0% - 4.6% and the precision of the estimates are the highest (p-
value less than 1%). Fifth, or more floor treatment effect is ranges from 3.9% to 0.8%. 
However, the treatment effect for building FE model with 95% confidence interval ranges 
from -1.99% to 3.65%. Consequently, the treatment effect is likely lower for the fifth floor 
compared to fourth floor according to building FE -model. On contrary, based on the 
postcode- and street FE models we cannot be confident about treatment effect being lower 
compared to fourth floor treatment effects. Based on the results, lift installation increases 
prices as the floor level increases at least until the fourth floor. 
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6.2. TREATMENT EFFECT BY MUNICIPALITY 
I used identical models compared to the table 7 by dividing the transaction sample by each 
municipality. Treatment*After –coefficients show the treatment effect of lift installations in 
the respective municipality. 
Table 9 – Treatment Effect by Municipality 
Postcode Fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Helsinki Tampere Oulu Espoo Lahti Kuopio Turku Jyväskylä Other 
          
Treatment -0.00734 0.0206 0.0286 -0.0187 0.0182 0.00548 0.0556** -0.0656** 0.0146 
 (0.00892) (0.0154) (0.0217) (0.0181) (0.0248) (0.0180) (0.0235) (0.0277) (0.0106) 
Treatment*After 0.0290** -0.0228 0.0458** 0.00871 -0.0475* -0.0116 -0.00546 0.0381 0.0393*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0216) (0.0186) (0.0335) (0.0279) (0.0168) (0.0175) (0.0381) (0.0132) 
Constant 11.11*** 10.68*** 10.67*** 11.08*** 10.50*** 10.52*** 10.41*** 10.58*** 10.46*** 
 (0.0403) (0.0626) (0.0768) (0.0366) (0.0451) (0.0727) (0.0663) (0.0391) (0.0336) 
          
Observations 56,341 19,233 9,329 11,137 9,877 7,713 12,553 8,660 135,778 
R-squared 0.901 0.875 0.810 0.851 0.862 0.864 0.876 0.870 0.847 
Street Fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Helsinki Tampere Oulu Espoo Lahti Kuopio Turku Jyväskylä Other 
          
Treatment 0.00186 0.0140 0.0126 -0.0165 0.00993 -0.00314 0.0112 -0.0358 -0.0105 
 (0.00842) (0.0151) (0.0170) (0.0358) (0.0116) (0.0247) (0.0130) (0.0282) (0.00822) 
Treatment*After 0.0157 -0.00168 0.0416** -0.000388 -0.0148 0.0193 0.00870 0.0449* 0.0433*** 
 (0.0123) (0.0156) (0.0170) (0.0272) (0.0197) (0.0145) (0.0193) (0.0260) (0.00950) 
Constant 11.14*** 10.70*** 10.62*** 11.07*** 10.46*** 10.50*** 10.50*** 10.52*** 10.40*** 
 (0.0390) (0.0495) (0.0631) (0.0562) (0.0610) (0.0795) (0.0317) (0.0370) (0.0321) 
          
Observations 56,341 19,233 9,329 11,137 9,877 7,713 12,553 8,660 135,778 
R-squared 0.923 0.917 0.877 0.896 0.900 0.897 0.927 0.906 0.901 
Building Fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
VARIABLES Helsinki Tampere Oulu Espoo Lahti Kuopio Turku Jyväskylä Other 
          
Treatment*After -0.00160 0.0219* 0.0641*** 0.0241 -0.0418* 0.0336* 0.0166 0.0227 0.0377*** 
 (0.0138) (0.0128) (0.0136) (0.0311) (0.0236) (0.0173) (0.0230) (0.0228) (0.0103) 
Constant 9.349*** 9.336*** 10.01*** 10.01*** 9.347*** 9.420*** 9.098*** 9.702*** 9.472*** 
 (0.0710) (0.0571) (0.0890) (0.0846) (0.138) (0.156) (0.0643) (0.0563) (0.0420) 
          
Observations 56,341 19,233 9,329 11,137 9,877 7,713 12,553 8,660 135,778 
R-squared 0.957 0.952 0.930 0.930 0.940 0.940 0.957 0.934 0.939 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by postcode. All the models include 
structural controls and year fixed effects. Significance levels are *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
The main finding of this table is that the confidence intervals are so large that almost all the 
results would fit in the previously found estimate of two percent treatment with 95 percent 
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confidence interval. The only deviation is from Oulu, where the treatment effect is 
remarkable 6.41%. 
6.1. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS 
Table 10 is an indicative projection about installation costs and property value increase for 
a housing condominium. I  mimic the “base-case” -scenario about lift installation to 
residential block of flat with four floors.  
Table 10 - Indicative Economic Effects of Lift Installation on Households 
Apartment 
Characteristics29 
Principle of cost 
allocation30 Costs Benefit Net cost 
Apart-
ment 
Floor 
Level 
Living 
Area 
(m2) 
Cost 
allocation 
score 
Share of 
total 
Costs 
allocated 
(€) 
est. 
Apartment 
value (€)31 
est. value 
increase 
% 
est. 
value 
increase
32 (€) Net cost (€) 
A1 1 60 60 3.3 % -2 250 128 600 0,71 %  900  -1 300  
A2 1 60 60 3.3 % -2 250 128 600 0,71 %  900  -1 300  
A3 1 60 60 3.3 % -2 250 128 600 0,71 %  900  -1 300  
A4 2 60 120 6.7 % -4 500 128 000 1,88 %  2 400  -2 100  
A5 2 60 120 6.7 % -4 500 128 000 1,88 %  2 400  -2 100  
A6 2 60 120 6.7 % -4 500 128 000 1,88 %  2 400  -2 100  
A7 3 60 180 10.0 % -6 750 128 000 2,81 %  3 600  -3 200  
A8 3 60 180 10.0 % -6 750 128 000 2,81 %  3 600  -3 200  
A9 3 60 180 10.0 % -6 750 128 000 2,81 %  3 600  -3 200  
A10 4 60 240 13.3 % -9 000 129 500 4,21 %  5 500  -3 500  
A11 4 60 240 13.3 % -9 000 129 500 4,21 %  5 500  -3 500  
A12 4 60 240 13.3 % -9 000 129 500 4,21 %  5 500  -3 500  
Total  720 1800 100 % -67 500 1 540 000  37 000 -30 000 
Notes: The table shows estimated economic impact of lift installation on tenants´ net wealth. Multiple 
assumptions are imposed: lift installation cost is 150 000€. ARA permits 45% and municipality 10% subsidies 
of the total costs. Housing condominium has only one stairway. Other assumptions are described in the 
footnotes.  
 
The first three columns describe the assumed apartments and their characteristics. The 
apartments are assumed identical (such as living area 60m2) except the floor level. The 
fourth and the fifth column assumes the principle of cost allocation being similar to the 
recommended way of sharing the costs. The sixth column shows the direct costs allocated. 
Columns 7-9 show the estimated property value increase. Last column is net monetary effect 
                                                 
29 Each apartment is assumed similar excluding the variation in the floor level. 
30 Maintenance charge score multiplied by floor level of the apartment determine the cost allocation score of 
retrolift installation. Maintenance charge score is used to determine maintenance cost allocation among the 
apartments. Usually it equals the living area. 
31 The estimated apartment value is based on hedonic regression model with postcode fixed effects.  
32 The estimated value increase percentages are means of postcode, street, and building fixed effects models 
from table 8 - treatment effects by floor. 
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for each of each apartment. Other assumptions are 150 000€ installation costs and 45% + 
10% subsidies from ARA and municipality. 
According to the costs -column, the first floor tenants pay 2250€ for the lift installation. The 
second floor tenants pay double the amount (4500€), third floor tenants triple times higher, 
and fourth floor four times higher share of the total costs. Despite wide range of direct costs 
allocated (2250€ – 9000€), the net costs are surprisingly close to each other for the 
apartments in different floors. The net cost  for the first floor apartments is 1300€, for the 
second floor 2100€, and for the third floor and fourth floor 3200€ and 3500€ respectively. 
Two aspects drive the estimated property value increase: The higher floor apartments on 
average are more expensive compared to lower floor apartments, and the relative value 
increase is higher as the floor level increases. 
Other outcome for the table is that the initial lift installation costs are only a fraction of the 
costs without the subsidies or property value increase. The initial cost is 150 000€. When 
the subsidies are included, the cost decreases to 67 500€. With property value increase 
included, the costs are only 30 000€, which is one fifth of the total costs. An alternative view 
is that the total discount for the housing condominium has increased from 55% to 80%. The 
additional discount 25%, (increase from 55% to 80%) was caused by the property value 
increase. The magnitude of the additional discount changes depends on the underlying 
assumptions. If the apartments were more expensive or the amount of apartments were 
higher, the additional discount would be higher.  
Based on the findings regarding additional discount, table 10 mitigates also the concern of 
undesired outcome of the subsidy policy. It would still require over thirty thousand euros 
investment for the housing condominium to install a lift. Most likely, the previously 
mentioned companies such as student housing providers are not willing to pay this amount 
of investment. Some interesting findings are received, when changing the assumptions in the 
table. 1) The amount of total subsidies could be slightly above 75%, before the property 
value increase would exceed the costs of lift installation. 2) Lift installation cost should 
decrease from 150 000€ to 82 500€ before property value increase would exceed the costs 
of lift installation. 3) If the treatment effects33 for each floor were at the upper bound of the 
95% confidence interval, the property value increase would slightly exceed the investment 
                                                 
33 Property value increase at the upper bound of 95% intervals are: 2.95%, 3.84%, 5.1%, and 6.5% for floor 
levels 1,2,3, and 4 respectively.  
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cost by 5 percent. 4) If the building had only 3 floors, the net cost after property value 
increase would be 46 800€, which is almost 60 percent higher, even though the number of 
dwellings that are sharing the costs had decreased only by 25 percent. 5) For the net effects 
to be identical34, the principle of cost allocation should multiply living area with figures 1.00, 
1.40, 1.72, 2.22 for floor levels 1,2,3,4 respectively. This principle would yield net cost of -
2 682€ for every household in the scenario. 6) If the cost allocation principle would share 
the installation costs evenly, the net costs for the first floor households would be -4700€, and 
the fourth floor tenants only -400€. Hence, the evenly allocated costs would be the more 
unequal method for cost allocation compared the current legislation. 
To conclude, table 10 should be considered as indicative calculation of lift installation costs 
for a base-case block of flat with no prior lift. The housing condominiums can apply the 
table to calculate their costs by taking the property value increase into account. The policy 
makers can utilize the finding that property value increase most likely do not exceed the 
investment cost with the current subsidy levels. If the policy makers wanted to increase the 
equality of net effects among the households with the cost allocation policy, the range of the 
cost allocation multipliers (1-4) should be decreased.  
The limitations of table 10 relate to simplified assumptions, and the external validity of the 
results of table 8. The lift installation costs are simplified at least in two ways. First, the cost 
of lift installation (150 000€ in my case) depends on many factors, such as the number of 
stops. The more floors, the more stops are required, and the higher is the cost. Second, the 
planning costs are omitted. Moreover, I have assumed no discount factor for the property 
value increase, even though it could be relevant in real life. The external validity of the floor 
level treatment effects (0-4%) is the highest for buildings shown in the descriptive statistics 
(table 4). Those buildings are constructed around year 1970, they have 3-5 floors, and their 
dwelling prices are around 2000-3000€/m2. If a building that differs remarkably from those 
characteristics, the treatment effects and implications could differ as well.  
                                                 
34 I the multipliers are calculated using Excel solver with GRG nonlinear method 
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This study has been motivated by the policy efforts to increase accessible housing supply by 
subsidizing lift installations. I identified positive externalities relating to the subsidy. 
However, the magnitude of the externalities depends on how well the subsidy reaches those 
who do not have enough wealth to relocate themselves to accessible housing after becoming 
physically restricted. The prior literature has been incomplete on how much the property 
values increase after lift installation. If the property value increase would exceed the 
subsidized installation costs, the subsidy was an income transfer for those who would not 
need it for living in accessible housing. Consequently, the magnitude of the positive 
externalities of the policy would decrease if lift installations caused a higher property value 
increase than the installation costs are. If there were no positive externalities, the policy 
would not be reasonable. 
The main research question is how much lift installations affect the dwelling prices. 
Moreover, I studied the effect heterogeneity by floor level and by municipality. I utilized a 
dataset from a consortium of real estate brokers, who had collected the majority of 
transactions in blocks of flats between years 2000-2018. I used a hedonic pricing model with 
two-way fixed effects difference in differences setup with an intention to create a causal 
relationship between lift installations and dwelling prices. 
My findings imply that between years 2000-2018, the lift installations have increased the 
dwelling prices by two percent on average. I increased the confidence for causal 
interpretation of the estimate by showing consistent pre-trends between the treatment and 
control groups prior the lift installation with the event-study approach. I found increasing 
treatment effects as the floor level increases by one unit until the fourth floor. I studied eight 
municipalities based on the number of lift installations. In seven municipalities, I cannot 
conclude that treatment effects would differ compared to the average two percent. An 
exception is Oulu, where the treatment effect has been six percent on average.  
Based on the results, the concern about high property value increase was mitigated. The 
households´ lift installation net costs in a “base-case” scenario are from one to four thousand 
euros per household after dwelling price increase. The total subsidy could be 75% before 
property value increase would exceed the installation costs. Another interpretation of the 
results is that the housing condominiums could receive an additional 25 percent discount on 
top of the nationwide and municipality´s subsidies due to property price increases. The 
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results also yield twofold perspectives on the law that determines the lift installation cost 
allocation criteria among households. Because lift installation increases the higher floor 
households´ wealth more compared to the lower floor households, it is reasonable to allocate 
more costs to the higher floor households. However, the results suggest that as the floor level 
increases, the share of costs increase slightly more than the property value increase. Thus, 
the cost allocation could be more equal if the rate of increase in the cost allocation multipliers 
between the floors were decreased. 
More extensive research related to this topic could be conducted with better data quality. 
The more precise data regarding the building- and stairway identification is needed to 
increase the reliability of the results if similar studies are conducted. Moreover, before 
conducting more exhaustive cost-benefit analysis regarding the lift subsidy, the 
characteristics of the subsidy recipients (housing condominiums and their households) were 
ought to be collected. It would enable more precise assessments on how well the subsidy 
policy reaches those who could not otherwise be relocated to accessible housing due to tight 
budget constraints.   
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APPENDIX 
Table 11 – Average Treatment Effect 
 (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Postcode FE Street FE Building FE 
    
Treatment 0.00609 -0.00554  
 (0.00690) (0.00548)  
Treatment*After 0.0274*** 0.0254*** 0.0203*** 
 (0.00792) (0.00657) (0.00727) 
Age -0.0208*** -0.0198*** 0.0163*** 
 (0.000662) (0.000749) (0.00230) 
Age2 0.000204*** 0.000183*** 7.93e-05 
 (9.74e-06) (9.99e-06) (5.19e-05) 
Age3 -4.03e-07*** -3.50e-07*** 7.42e-07** 
 (3.42e-08) (2.95e-08) (2.91e-07) 
Living Area 0.0104*** 0.0104*** 0.0106*** 
 (0.000458) (0.000396) (0.000374) 
Maintenance Charge (€) -0.000316*** -0.000231*** -0.000193*** 
 (5.91e-05) (4.33e-05) (4.07e-05) 
Number of floors (0/1)    
3 -0.00407 0.00588  
 (0.00619) (0.00538)  
4 0.0190** 0.0184***  
 (0.00754) (0.00607)  
5 0.0334*** 0.0302***  
 (0.00921) (0.00688)  
6 0.0278*** 0.0221***  
 (0.00942) (0.00663)  
7 0.0336*** 0.0220***  
 (0.0110) (0.00684)  
8 0.0160 0.0180**  
 (0.0129) (0.00709)  
9 0.0271** 0.0306***  
 (0.0109) (0.0113)  
Number of rooms (0/1)    
1 -0.0867 -0.0695 -0.0951* 
 (0.0611) (0.0597) (0.0574) 
2 0.0660 0.0775 0.0355 
 (0.0609) (0.0602) (0.0567) 
3 0.136** 0.143** 0.0875 
 (0.0616) (0.0613) (0.0568) 
4 0.167*** 0.161** 0.0956* 
 (0.0629) (0.0627) (0.0574) 
5 0.126* 0.0956 0.0402 
 (0.0645) (0.0645) (0.0585) 
Apartment Condition, Broker 
estimate (0/1) 
   
Poor -0.163*** -0.160*** -0.156*** 
 (0.00587) (0.00531) (0.00533) 
Decent -0.0509*** -0.0485*** -0.0463*** 
 (0.00315) (0.00281) (0.00278) 
Good 0.0800*** 0.0718*** 0.0655*** 
 (0.00287) (0.00252) (0.00244) 
Excellent 0.172*** 0.154*** 0.133*** 
 (0.0143) (0.0150) (0.0138) 
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Floor Level (0/1)    
1 0.0163** 0.0120* 0.0132** 
 (0.00745) (0.00660) (0.00660) 
2 0.0226*** 0.0160** 0.0159** 
 (0.00740) (0.00667) (0.00667) 
3 0.0227*** 0.0173** 0.0162** 
 (0.00748) (0.00674) (0.00676) 
4 0.0387*** 0.0307*** 0.0277*** 
 (0.00784) (0.00712) (0.00719) 
5 0.0567*** 0.0491*** 0.0471*** 
 (0.00831) (0.00745) (0.00747) 
6 0.0657*** 0.0571*** 0.0604*** 
 (0.00909) (0.00819) (0.00900) 
7 0.0939*** 0.0864*** 0.0800*** 
 (0.0104) (0.00961) (0.0104) 
8 0.0927*** 0.101*** 0.1000*** 
 (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0126) 
9 0.103*** 0.0935*** 0.111*** 
 (0.0164) (0.0175) (0.0190) 
Sale Year (0/1)    
2001 0.000457 0.000725 -0.0345*** 
 (0.00549) (0.00509) (0.00557) 
2002 0.0675*** 0.0714*** 0.00571 
 (0.00635) (0.00566) (0.00578) 
2003 0.142*** 0.148*** 0.0461*** 
 (0.00617) (0.00571) (0.00564) 
2004 0.216*** 0.219*** 0.0850*** 
 (0.00694) (0.00654) (0.00662) 
2005 0.280*** 0.286*** 0.116*** 
 (0.00708) (0.00665) (0.00696) 
2006 0.366*** 0.370*** 0.165*** 
 (0.00744) (0.00710) (0.00713) 
2007 0.427*** 0.432*** 0.193*** 
 (0.00728) (0.00716) (0.00707) 
2008 0.450*** 0.455*** 0.182*** 
 (0.00736) (0.00715) (0.00768) 
2009 0.466*** 0.470*** 0.163*** 
 (0.00791) (0.00713) (0.00728) 
2010 0.550*** 0.556*** 0.214*** 
 (0.00798) (0.00758) (0.00693) 
2011 0.588*** 0.591*** 0.214*** 
 (0.00825) (0.00787) (0.00698) 
2012 0.618*** 0.620*** 0.208*** 
 (0.00867) (0.00822) (0.00685) 
2013 0.641*** 0.645*** 0.200*** 
 (0.00934) (0.00892) (0.00673) 
2014 0.649*** 0.653*** 0.171*** 
 (0.00986) (0.00944) (0.00657) 
2015 0.644*** 0.646*** 0.130*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0102) (0.00621) 
2016 0.655*** 0.658*** 0.102*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.00574) 
2017 0.656*** 0.655*** 0.0659*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0119) (0.00530) 
2018 0.662*** 0.661*** 0.0382*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0136) (0.00411) 
2019 0.664*** 0.661***  
 (0.0141) (0.0147)  
Constant 10.78*** 10.76*** 9.735*** 
 (0.0670) (0.0631) (0.0700) 
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Observations 270,621 270,621 270,621 
R-squared 0.905 0.936 0.960 
Structural Controls YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
Postcode FE YES NO NO 
Street FE NO YES NO 
Building FE NO NO YES 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by postcode. Significance levels are 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Table 12 – Treatment Effect by Floor 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Postcode FE Street FE Building FE 
    
Treatment*Floor level    
1. 0.00364 -0.0134 0.0891 
 (0.0104) (0.00865) (0.0630) 
2. 0.00882 -0.00674 0.0934 
 (0.00847) (0.00637) (0.0630) 
3. 0.0123 -0.00471 0.0951 
 (0.00767) (0.00655) (0.0632) 
4. -0.00412 -0.00279 0.114* 
 (0.0128) (0.0103) (0.0635) 
5. 0.00660 0.0188 0.158** 
 (0.0164) (0.0146) (0.0643) 
Treatment*Floor level*After    
1. 0.00610 0.00714 0.00798 
 (0.0129) (0.0108) (0.0125) 
2. 0.0282*** 0.0158* 0.0126 
 (0.0100) (0.00855) (0.00943) 
3. 0.0234** 0.0286*** 0.0322*** 
 (0.0102) (0.00869) (0.0107) 
4. 0.0463*** 0.0399*** 0.0400*** 
 (0.0145) (0.0113) (0.0107) 
5. 0.0385** 0.0270* 0.00832 
 (0.0179) (0.0159) (0.0144) 
age -0.0208*** -0.0197*** 0.0163*** 
 (0.000663) (0.000749) (0.00230) 
age2 0.000203*** 0.000182*** 7.86e-05 
 (9.73e-06) (9.97e-06) (5.19e-05) 
age3 -4.02e-07*** -3.50e-07*** 7.43e-07** 
 (3.41e-08) (2.94e-08) (2.91e-07) 
Number of Floors (0/1)    
3 -0.00315 0.00690  
 (0.00619) (0.00539)  
4 0.0242*** 0.0227***  
 (0.00760) (0.00608)  
5 0.0442*** 0.0394***  
 (0.00931) (0.00684)  
6 0.0439*** 0.0357***  
 (0.00972) (0.00674)  
7 0.0572*** 0.0422***  
 (0.0115) (0.00705)  
8 0.0449*** 0.0444***  
 (0.0129) (0.00700)  
9 0.0599*** 0.0593***  
 (0.0111) (0.0117)  
Number of Rooms (0/1)    
1. -0.0924 -0.0758 -0.0948* 
 (0.0611) (0.0597) (0.0575) 
2. 0.0603 0.0710 0.0355 
 (0.0610) (0.0603) (0.0568) 
3. 0.131** 0.136** 0.0870 
 (0.0618) (0.0615) (0.0569) 
4. 0.161** 0.155** 0.0954* 
 (0.0632) (0.0630) (0.0575) 
5. 0.121* 0.0900 0.0406 
 (0.0650) (0.0650) (0.0587) 
Living Area (0/1) 0.0104*** 0.0104*** 0.0106*** 
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 (0.000459) (0.000398) (0.000376) 
Maintenance Charge -0.000317*** -0.000231*** -0.000192*** 
 (5.90e-05) (4.33e-05) (4.08e-05) 
Apartment Condition, Broker estimate 
(0/1) 
   
Poor -0.163*** -0.160*** -0.156*** 
 (0.00586) (0.00529) (0.00532) 
Decent -0.0507*** -0.0484*** -0.0463*** 
 (0.00315) (0.00281) (0.00279) 
Good 0.0804*** 0.0720*** 0.0657*** 
 (0.00287) (0.00252) (0.00245) 
Excellent 0.171*** 0.155*** 0.134*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0153) (0.0140) 
Sale Year (0/1)    
2001 0.000299 0.000522 -0.0344*** 
 (0.00550) (0.00509) (0.00556) 
2002 0.0664*** 0.0707*** 0.00573 
 (0.00633) (0.00565) (0.00577) 
2003 0.142*** 0.147*** 0.0460*** 
 (0.00616) (0.00570) (0.00564) 
2004 0.215*** 0.218*** 0.0848*** 
 (0.00693) (0.00655) (0.00662) 
2005 0.279*** 0.285*** 0.116*** 
 (0.00705) (0.00663) (0.00695) 
2006 0.365*** 0.369*** 0.165*** 
 (0.00743) (0.00710) (0.00713) 
2007 0.427*** 0.431*** 0.193*** 
 (0.00727) (0.00717) (0.00709) 
2008 0.449*** 0.455*** 0.182*** 
 (0.00736) (0.00716) (0.00769) 
2009 0.466*** 0.470*** 0.163*** 
 (0.00790) (0.00712) (0.00729) 
2010 0.549*** 0.555*** 0.214*** 
 (0.00797) (0.00758) (0.00693) 
2011 0.587*** 0.590*** 0.214*** 
 (0.00823) (0.00787) (0.00699) 
2012 0.617*** 0.619*** 0.208*** 
 (0.00867) (0.00822) (0.00685) 
2013 0.641*** 0.645*** 0.200*** 
 (0.00933) (0.00892) (0.00672) 
2014 0.648*** 0.652*** 0.171*** 
 (0.00983) (0.00943) (0.00657) 
2015 0.643*** 0.645*** 0.130*** 
 (0.0104) (0.0102) (0.00621) 
2016 0.655*** 0.657*** 0.102*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.00574) 
2017 0.655*** 0.654*** 0.0660*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0119) (0.00530) 
2018 0.662*** 0.660*** 0.0382*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0136) (0.00412) 
2019 0.663*** 0.660***  
 (0.0141) (0.0147)  
    
Constant 10.81*** 10.78*** 9.749*** 
 (0.0663) (0.0615) (0.0697) 
    
Observations 270,572 270,572 270,572 
R-squared 0.904 0.935 0.960 
Structural Controls YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES 
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Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by postcode. Significance levels are 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Table 13 - Potential Alternative Control Groups 
 Control Group Control Group Treatment Group  
 Always lift Never lift Installed Lift Total sample 
VARIABLE mean mean mean mean 
Municipality (0/1)     
Other 39.3 % 52.9 % 44.8 % 50.1 % 
Espoo 3.3 % 4.3 % 3.8 % 4.1 % 
Helsinki 22.8 % 20.1 % 27.4 % 20.8 % 
Jyväskylä 3.1 % 3.2 % 3.2 % 3.2 % 
Kuopio 3.5 % 2.7 % 3.5 % 2.9 % 
Lahti 6.3 % 3.0 % 4.2 % 3.7 % 
Oulu 5.0 % 3.0 % 4.1 % 3.4 % 
Tampere 7.9 % 7.0 % 5.3 % 7.1 % 
Turku 8.9 % 3.7 % 3.6 % 4.7 % 
     
Building Characteristics    
Lift (0/1) 1 0 0.52 0.20 
Construction Year 1972 1968 1971 1969 
Age 37.1 41.7 39.1 40.8 
Number of Floors 5.65 3.06 4.64 3.60 
     
Dwelling Characteristics    
Price35 (€) 148 759 104 627 151 249 114 351 
Price (€/m2) 2 465 1 914 2 526 2 037 
Living Area 60.0 56.4 59.6 57.2 
Maintenance Charge36 
(€) 169 173 183 172 
Number of rooms 2.28 2.18 2.27 2.20 
Floor Level 3.32 2.06 2.81 2.32 
     
Apartment condition, Broker estimate (0/1)   
Unknown 10 % 10 % 8 % 10 % 
Poor 3 % 3 % 3 % 3 % 
Decent 27 % 31 % 28 % 30 % 
Good 59 % 56 % 60 % 57 % 
Excellent 1 % 0 % 1 % 0 % 
     
Obs. 51 490 212 784 8 062 272 336 
 
 
                                                 
35 Is total payment that the buyer pays in transaction 
36 Maintenance charge is monthly payment from housing condominium maintenance expenses. It does not 
include charge from financial costs 
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Figure 4 – Effect of Lift installation on Sale Time 
 
Notes: Dependent variable is logarithm of Sale Time (days of apartment being on markets). Structural, and 
year fixed effects are used in all of the models. Confidence interval: 95%. Standard errors are clustered by 
postode. The four estimates imply 5 percent reduction in sale time. 
